Efeitos em preço do compartilhamento de voos de companhias aéreas como reação à presença de um competidor de baixo custo

Authors

  • Wellington Carlos Costa ITA (Instituto Tecnológico de Aeronáutica) Departamento de Transporte Aéreo
  • Alessandro Vinícius Marques Oliveira ITA (Instituto Tecnológico de Aeronáutica) Departamento de Transporte Aéreo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14295/transportes.v23i1.814

Keywords:

codeshare, low cost carrier.

Abstract

This paper aims to study the competitive effects of a type of strategic alliance that has received much more attention from airlines: the codeshare agreement. The intention is to evaluate the price effects caused by the implementation of codeshare when established between incumbent carriers facing the entrance of a new competitor Low Cost Carrier, a subject not yet addressed in the literature. For this, we developed an econometric model using fixed-effects estimator for application in a case study evidenced in the early 2000s, known as "Codeshare Varig-TAM". The model analyses the effects on the price of the air tickets due to the entrance of a newcomer Low Cost Carrier. The results indicate reductions on the average price in all cases. In conditions where the codeshare was not implemented, the price reduction was 12.4%. On the other hand, when the codeshare already established, the reduction was only 8.3%. These findings allow us to conclude that the codeshare can be a strategic tool for dominant airlines to mitigate the action of price reduction (and impacts on profitability) when competing directly against Low Cost Carriers.

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Published

2015-05-12

How to Cite

Costa, W. C., & Oliveira, A. V. M. (2015). Efeitos em preço do compartilhamento de voos de companhias aéreas como reação à presença de um competidor de baixo custo. TRANSPORTES, 23(1), 14–23. https://doi.org/10.14295/transportes.v23i1.814

Issue

Vol. 23 No. 1 (2015)

Section

Artigos

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